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ABSTRACT 
A freely moving nodes forming as group to communicate 
among themselves are called as Mobile AdHoc Networks 
(MANET). Many applications are choosing this MANET for 
effective commutation due to its flexible nature in forming a 
network. But due to its openness characteristics it is posing 
many security challenges. As it has highly dynamic network 
topology security for routing is playing a major role. We have 
very good routing protocols for route discovery as well as for 
transporting data packers but most of them lack the feature of 
security like AODV. In this paper we are studying the basic 
protocol AODV and identify how it can be made secure. We 
are studying a protocol S-AODV which is a security extension 
of AODV which is called Secure AODV (S-AODV) and we 
are studying enhanced version of  S-AODV routing protocol a 
Adaptive Secure AODV (A-SAODV). Finally we have 
described about the parameter to be taken for performance 
evaluation of different secure routing protocols. 
Keywords: MANET, AODV, Secure Routing Protocols 
SAODV, A-SAODV, Performance evaluation parameters. 
1. INTRODUCTION:
A self configured moving nodes forming as a group 
to communicate each other is called as Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks (MANET). Now a day’s MANET’s became very 
much popular and they have been used in most of the systems 
due to its flexibility in forming a network with less 
infrastructure requirement, its speed of configuration and they 
can be easily deployable. 
MANETs became very much popular due to their 
wide variety applications, they are Law of enforcement 
operations automated military applications like Battlefield 
communications, Rescue & disaster recovery operations, 
Interactive lectures and Data sharing in classrooms, Meeting 
events and conferences, intelligent building and logistics etc. 
MANETs are usually set up in situations of 
emergency for temporary operations or simply if there are no 
resources to set up elaborate networks. These types of 
networks operate in the absence of any fixed infrastructure, 
which makes them easy to deploy, at the same time however, 
due to the absence of any fixed infrastructure, it becomes 
difficult to make use of the existing routing techniques for 
network services, and this poses a number of challenges in 
ensuring the security of the communication, something that is 
not easily done as many of the demands of network security 
conflict with the demands of mobile networks, mainly due to 
the nature of the mobile devices (e.g. low power consumption, 
low processing load). 
Many of the ad hoc routing protocols that address 
security issues rely on implicit trust relationships to route 
packets among participating nodes. Besides the general 
security objectives like authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity, availability and non-repudiation, the ad hoc routing 
protocols should also address location confidentiality, 
cooperation fairness and absence of traffic diversion. 
During the last few years, we have all witnessed a 
continuously increasing growth in the deployment of wireless 
and mobile communication networks. Mobile ad hoc networks 
consist of nodes that are able to communicate through the use 
of wireless mediums and form dynamic topologies. The basic 
characteristic of these networks is the complete lack of any 
kind of infrastructure, and therefore the absence of dedicated 
nodes that provide network management operations like the 
traditional routers in fixed networks. In order to maintain 
connectivity in a mobile ad hoc network all participating 
nodes have to perform routing of network traffic. The 
cooperation of nodes cannot be enforced by a centralized 
administration authority since one does not exist. Therefore, a 
network layer protocol designed for such self-organized 
networks must enforce connectivity and security requirements 
in order to guarantee the undisrupted operation of the higher 
layer protocols [1]. Unfortunately all of the widely used ad 
hoc routing protocols have no security considerations and 
trust all the participants to correctly forward routing and data 
traffic. This assumption can prove to be disastrous for an ad 
hoc network that relies on intermediate nodes for packet 
forwarding.  
Researchers found many protocols to secure the 
AODV protocol, they have added few security features to the 
existing AODV protocol and it is one of the most efficient 
routing protocols into which security measures can be 
included. It is observed that complete belief of the network on 
nodes can lead to many routing attacks. To avoid this, security 
measures are added to AODV to make it Secure. In this paper 
we are studying the extension of AODV protocols like S-
AODV,  
A-SAODV, this study is made to compare the performance
between these routing protocols, original AODV (Ad hoc On
Demand Distance Vector), Secure AODV, Adaptive (A-
SAODV).
The paper is organized in the following way section 
1 introduces about MANET, section 2 describes about 
AODV, section 3 tells about secure routing protocols, section 
4 briefs about the parameters for performance evaluation for 
secure routing protocols, section 5 with conclusion. 
2. RELATED WORK
2.1. Ad hoc On demand Distance Vector
Routing (AODV) [2] protocol:
2.1.1 Mechanism of AODV protocol: AODV is
perhaps the most well-known routing protocol for a MANET. 
It is a reactive protocol it is proved to be an efficient routing 
protocol for implementation in Ad hoc networks. 
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It is a Source-Initiated On-Demand or Reactive Routing 
Protocol. When a source node desires to send a packet to the 
destination node for which it does not have a valid route, it 
initiates a route discovery process.  
Figure 1: Route Discovery Procedure of AODV Protocol 
There are three kinds of routing messages which are generated 
by this routing protocol during the establishment of route 
from source to destination they are: 
-RREQ (Route Request).
-RREP (Route Reply).
-RERR (Route Error).
The source node broadcasts an RREQ (Route Request) 
message to its neighbors, which then forward the request to 
their neighbors, and so on, until either the destination or an 
intermediate node with a route to the destination in its routing 
table is reached. During the process of forwarding the RREQ, 
an intermediate node record in its routing table (i.e., precursor 
list) the address of the neighbor from which the first copy of 
the broadcast packet is received, thereby establishing a 
reverse path. Additional copies of the same RREQ received 
later are discarded.  
Once the RREQ reaches the destination or an 
intermediate node with a route, the respective node responds 
by RREP (Route Reply) message back to the neighbor from 
which it first received the RREQ, which relays the RREP 
backward via the precursor nodes to the source node. Routes 
are maintained as follows: HELLO beacons are sent 
periodically via broadcast to the neighboring nodes. When a 
source node moves, it has to re-initiate the route discovery 
protocol to find a new route to the destination.  
On the other hand, when an intermediate node along 
the route moves, its upstream neighbor will notice route 
breakage due to the movement and propagate an RERR 
(Route Error) message to each of its active upstream 
neighbors. These nodes in turn propagate the RERR packet to 
their upstream neighbors, and so on until the source node is 
reached. The source node may then choose to re-initiate the 
route discovery for that destination if a route is still desired. 
Every routing table entry at every node must include the latest 
information available about the sequence number for the IP 
address of the destination node for which the route table entry 
is maintained. This sequence number is called the “destination 
sequence number”. It is updated whenever a node receives 
new information about the sequence number from RREQ, 
RREP, or RERR messages that may be received related to that 
destination.  
AODV depends on each node in the network to own 
and maintain its destination sequence number to guarantee the 
loop-freedom of all the routes towards that node. A 
destination node increments its own sequence number under 
two circumstances:  
(a) Immediately before a node originates a route
discovery; it must increment its own sequence number. This 
prevents problems with deleted reverse routes to the originator 
of a RREQ.  
(b) Immediately before a destination node originates
a RREP in response to a RREQ, it must update its own 
sequence number to the maximum of its current sequence 
number and the destination sequence number in the RREQ 
packet.  
2.2. Attacks on AODV protocol during the 
establishment of route. 
AODV depends on each node in the network to 
establish a network (route), here comes the problem, the node 
what AODV believes to establish a network may be a 
malicious or compromised node. These malicious nodes can 
attack routing protocols in several ways. These attacks can be 
categorized as passive attacks and active attacks. 
Passive attacks: A passive routing attack does not disrupt the 
operation of a routing protocol, but only attempts to discover 
valuable information by listening to the routing traffic. Hence 
such attacks are difficult to detect.  
Active attacks: An active attack attempts to improperly 
modify data, gain authentication, or procure authorization by 
inserting false packets into the data steam or modifying 
packets transition through the network. Active attacks are of 
two types: external and internal. An external attack is one 
caused by nodes that do not belong to the network. An 
internal attack is one from compromised or hijacked nodes 
that belong to the network. As malicious nodes already belong 
to the network as authorized parties, and hence are protected 
with network security mechanisms and services, therefore, 
internal attacks are more severe.  
The attacks on the AODV routing protocol [2, 3] are: 
(a).Message tampering attack: An attacker can alter the 
content of routing messages and forward them with falsified 
information. For example, by reducing the hop-count field in 
either an RREQ or RREP packet, an attacker can increase its 
chance to be an intermediate node of the route. A selfish node 
can relieve the burden of forwarding messages for others by 
setting the hop-count field of the RREQ to infinity. 
(b).Message dropping attack: Both attackers and selfish 
nodes can intentionally drop some (or all) routing and data 
messages. Since all the mobile nodes within a MANET 
function as both end hosts and routers, this attack can paralyze 
the network completely as the number of message dropping 
increases. 
(c).Message replay (or wormhole) attack: Attackers can 
retransmit eavesdropped messages again later in a different 
place. One type of replay attacks is the wormhole attack. A 
wormhole attacker can tunnel an RREQ directly to a 
destination node. Since a wormhole attacker may not increase 
the hop-count field value, it prevents any other routes from 
being discovered. The wormhole attack can be combined with 
the message dropping attack to prevent the destination node 
from receiving packets. 
2.3. The features required for [4] AODV 
routing protocol to provide security: 
(a) Source authentication: The receiver should be able to
confirm that the identity of the source is indeed who or what it
claims to be.
(b) Neighbor authentication: The receiver should be able to
confirm that the identity of the sender (i.e., one hop previous
node) is indeed who or what it claims to be.
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(c) Message integrity: The receiver should be able to verify
that the content of a message has not been altered either
maliciously or accidentally in transit.
(d)Access control: It is necessary to ensure that mobile nodes
seeking to gain access to the network have the appropriate
access rights.
3. SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOLS
3.1. Secure AODV (S-AODV) [5]:
SAODV is a security extension of AODV protocol based on 
public key cryptography. SAODV routing messages (RREQs, 
RREPs, and RERRs) are digitally signed to guarantee their 
integrity and authenticity. It avoids active external attacks by 
not forwarding route requests to the external nodes. This is 
done by authenticating all the nodes of the network by issuing 
the same passwords to all the nodes. Before forwarding route 
request to a neighbor, a node first checks the authenticity of 
the neighboring node by verifying its password. If it is found 
legal, then only route request is forwarded. In this way, 
external nodes are excluded from entry into the network.  
In SAODV, (i).digital signatures are used to authenticate 
RREQ and RREP messages and (ii).hash chains are used to 
authenticate the hop-count fields within the RREQ and RREP 
messages. 
A node that generates a routing message signs it 
with its private key and the nodes that receive this message 
verify the signature using the sender’s public key. The hop 
count cannot be signed by the sender, because it must be 
incremented at every hop, to protect it hash chain a 
mechanism is used. In this way malicious node cannot 
increment the hop count only destination node can give RREP 
reply, because the RREP message must be signed by the 
destination node. 
S-AODV also includes a mechanism called “double
signature” by which intermediate node can reply to RREQ 
messages. When a node N1 generates a RREQ message, in 
addition to the regular signature, it can include a second 
signature, which is computed on RREP message towards N1 
itself. Intermediate nodes can store this second signature in 
their routing table, along with other routing information 
related to node N1. If one of these nodes then receives a 
RREQ towards node N1, it can reply on behalf of N1 with a 
RREP message, similarly to what happens with regular 
AODV. To do so, the intermediate node generates the RREP 
message, includes the signature of node N1 that it previously 
cached, and signs the message with its own private key. 
SAODV does not require additional messages when compared 
to AODV. Due to digital signatures SAODV messages are 
bigger. Moreover, SAODV requires heavy weight asymmetric 
cryptographic operations, every time a node generates a 
routing message, it must generate a signature, and every time 
it receives a routing message (also as an intermediate node), it 
must verify a signature. This gets worse when the double 
signature mechanism is used, because this may require the 
generation or verification of two signatures for a single 
message. The major operations of SAODV to authenticate 
routing data are hash chains and signatures. 
3.1.1. SAODV Signatures
To calculate signatures, Hop Count field is set to 
zero, as it is a mutable field. In the case of the Signature for 
RREP field of the RREQ Double Signature Extension, what is 
signed is the future RREP message that nodes might send 
back in response to the RREQ.  
To construct this message it uses the values of the RREQ and 
the Prefix Size (the RREP field that is not derivable from the 
RREQ but not zeroed when computing the signature. In the 
case of RREPs, R and A flags are set to zero. SAODV is not 
designed taking into account AODV multicast ('R' flag is used 
in multicast) and 'A' flag is mutable and, if an attacker alters 
it, it can only lead to some sort of denial of service. Every 
time a node generates a RREQ it decides if it should be signed 
with a Single Signature Extension or with a Double Signature 
Extension. All implementations MUST support RREQ Single 
Signature Extension, and SHOULD support RREQ Double 
Signature Extension. A node that generates a RREQ with the 
gratuitous RREP flag set SHOULD sign the RREQ with a 
Double Signature Extension. A node SHOULD never 
generate a RREQ without adding a Signature Extension.  
When a node receives a RREQ, first verify the 
signature before creating or updating a reverse route to that 
host. Only if the signature is verified, it will store the route. If 
the RREQ was received with a Double Signature Extension, 
then the node will also store the signature, the lifetime and the 
Destination IP address for the RREP in the route entry. If a 
node receives a RREQ without a Signature Extension it 
SHOULD drop it. An intermediate node will reply a RREQ 
with a RREP only if fulfills the AODV requirements to do so, 
and the node has the corresponding signature and the old 
lifetime and old originator IP address to put into the 
'Signature', 'Old Lifetime' and 'Old Originator IP address' 
fields of the RREP Double signature Extension. Otherwise, it 
will rebroadcast the RREQ. When a RREQ is received by the 
destination itself, it will reply with a RREP only if fulfills the 
AODV requirements to do so. This RREP will be sent with a 
RREP Single Signature Extension.  
All implementations MUST support RREP Single 
Signature Extension, and SHOULD support RREP Double 
Signature Extension. A node SHOULD never generate a 
RREP without adding a Signature Extension. This also applies 
to gratuitous RREPs. When a node receives a RREP, first 
verifies the signature before creating or updating a route to 
that host. Only if the signature is verified, it will store the 
route with the signature and the lifetime and the originator IP 
address of the RREP. If a node receives a RREP without a 
Signature Extension it SHOULD drop it. Every node, 
generating or forwarding a RERR message, uses digital 
signatures to sign the whole message and any neighbor that 
receives verifies the signature. 
In this way it can verify that the sender of the RERR 
message is really the one that claims to be. And, since 
destination sequence numbers are not singed by the 
corresponding node, a node SHOULD never update any 
destination sequence number of its routing table based on a 
RRER message. Although nodes will not trust destination 
sequence numbers in a RERR message, they will use them to 
decide whether they should invalidate a route or not. 
3.1.2. SAODV Hash Chains 
Hash chains are used in SAODV to authenticate the 
hop count of the AODV routing messages (not only by the 
end points, but by any node that receives one of those 
messages. Every time a node wants to send a RREQ or a 
RREP it generates a random number (seed). Select a 
Maximum Hop Count. Maximum Hop Count SHOULD be set 
to the TTL value in the IP header, and SHOULD never exceed 
its configuration parameter NET_DIAMETER. 
The Hash field in the Signature Extension is set to 
the seed. The Top Hash field is set to the seed hashed Max 
Hop Count times. Every time a node receives a RREQ or a 
RREP it verifies the hop count by hashing Max Hop Count 
Hop Count times the Hash field, and checking that the 
resultant value is the same than the Top Hash. If the check 
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fails, the node SHOULD drop the packet. Before 
rebroadcasting a RREQ or forwarding a RREP, a node hashes 
one time the Hash field in the Signature Extension.  
The function used to compute the hash is set in the 
Hash Function field. Since this field is signed, a forwarding 
node will only be able to use the same hash function that the 
originator of the routing message has selected. If a node 
cannot verify or forward a routing message because it does 
not support the hash function that has been used, then it drops 
the packet. 
3.1.3. The problems addressed by SAODV. 
It avoids active external attacks by not forwarding 
route requests to the external nodes. The problem of route 
table overflow is solved by updating the tables at regular 
intervals. SAODV solves the problem of blackhole by 
disabling the intermediate nodes to send route replies and 
there by allowing the generation of route reply only by the 
destination node. No malicious node can read the data in the 
data packet due to the encryption of the message. Every node 
checks password before forwarding the RREQ. All nodes on 
the route from source to destination are secure and fulfill 
security requirements of the sender.  
3.2 Adaptive Secure AODV (A-SAODV) 
Adaptive Secure AODV (A-SAODV) [3] is a 
prototype implementation of SAODV, based on the AODV-
UU. It follows multi threaded application which avoids the 
blocking of processing of other messages. It has two 
execution threads: one dedicated to cryptographic operations 
and the other to handle the functions like routing message 
processing, SAODV routing table management, timeout 
management, SAODV message generation and data packet 
forwarding. 
The two threads communicate via a first input first 
output (FIFO) queue containing all the messages that must be 
signed or verified. The prototype developed includes an 
experimental feature, the adaptive reply decision, to optimize 
SAODV performance with respect to the double signature 
option. 
In AODV, allowing intermediate nodes to generate RREPs on 
behalf of the destination node has a positive impact on 
performance, because it does not require heavyweight 
operations by intermediate nodes themselves. The situation is 
different in SAODV, because generating such a reply requires 
the intermediate node to generate a cryptographic signature 
nodes may spend much time in computing these signatures 
and become overloaded. 
Moreover, if intermediate nodes have a long queue 
of routing messages that must be cryptographically processed, 
the resulting delay may be longer than if the request reaches 
the destination node. If the double signature mechanism 
removed, an uncollaborative protocol created, in which only 
the destination node is allowed to reply to a RREQ message. 
This is possible, the A-SAODV approach makes the double 
signature feature adaptive: intermediate nodes reply to 
RREQs only if they are not overloaded. Each node has a 
queue of routing messages to be signed or verified 
When a node receives a RREQ message and has the 
information to generate a RREP on behalf of the destination, 
it checks the queue length and compares it with a threshold. If 
the queue length is lower than the threshold, the node 
generates a RREP (collaborative behavior); otherwise it 
forwards the RREQ without replying (uncollaborative 
behavior). The same mechanism can be applied when 
generating a RREQ message in order to decide between a 
single signature and a double signature. In the simplest case, 
the threshold can be a fixed value; however, this would not be 
very flexible because the value maybe adjustable, depending 
on external factors (e.g., battery state). In the A-SAODV 
prototype, the threshold value can be changed during 
execution (two special values allow always reply behavior and 
never reply behavior). Other, more elaborate strategies could 
be defined to estimate the crypto queue delay and 
consequently decide whether to reply or forward the message.  
For example, a fixed threshold (based on the timeouts defined 
by the routing protocol) and a predictor of queuing times 
could be used. In this way, the algorithm could adapt itself to 
the situation and the computing power of the node. An 
additional external parameter could be used to take into 
account the previously mentioned external factors (how much 
a node is willing to collaborate, e.g., depending on its battery 
state). Another little optimization included in the A-SAODV 
prototype is a cache of latest signed and verified messages, in 
order to avoid signing or verifying the same message twice. 
Each of the above mentioned protocols have their 
own merits and demerits upon the user requirement a 
particular protocol may be selected, but no protocol is perfect 
many researches are going in this field to extend the features 
of protocols.  
4. PARAMETERS OF PERFORMACE
EVALUTION
The following parameters are generally used to 
evaluate the performance of secure routing protocols during 
establishment of a route and packet delivery. 
(a). No. of data packets Vs No. of nodes in the network : It 
describes the number of data packets reaching to the nodes in 
a legitimate network 
 (b). No. of data packets Vs No. of malicious nodes: It 
describes the number of data packets reaching to the nodes in 
a malicious environment 
 (c). Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) Vs No. of malicious nodes: 
PDR is the ratio of the number of data packets received by the 
destination to the number of data packets sent by the source.  
(d).The average end to end delay: The delay experienced by 
packet from the time it was sent by a source till the time it 
reached the destination. This includes all possible delays 
caused by buffering during route discovery latency, queuing 
at the interface queue, retransmission delays at the MAC and 
propagation and transfer times. For each packet sent, calculate 
the send time and receive time, then average it. 
(e) Number of Dropped Packets: This shows the total number
of dropped packets.
(f). Routing Control Overhead: The amount of overhead
during the transportation of data packet (in bytes)
(g). Routing Overhead: The number of routing packets
transmitted for every data packet sent. Each hop of the routing
packet is treated as a packet. Normalized routing load are
used as the ratio of routing packets to the data packets.
Normalized Routing Load = routing packets sent / packet
received
(h). Routing Packets: It shows the amount of routing packets
(i.e. RREQ, RREP and RERR) generated during one
transmission.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced the MANET and 
the importance of securing a routing protocol like AODV. We 
have focused on the drawbacks of AODV and pointed out 
what features can be added to make AODV secure, there are 
other features what can be still added to make AODV more 
secure. We have discussed S- AODV which is a security 
extension of AODV. S-AODV can be further explored to add 
more features which is a future work.     We have discussed 
A-SAODV which is an extension of S-AODV into which can
also future extensions can be done. We have to further explore
deep into the various approaches of providing security on the
basic mechanism of routing.
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